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Wagy: Governor Leroy Collins of Florida and the Selma Crisis of 1965

GOVERNOR LEROY COLLINS OF FLORIDA
AND THE SELMA CRISIS OF 1965
by THOMAS R. W AGY *
T
O Alabama,

March 9, 1965, a bright sun shone on Selma,
replacing the gray, gloomy weather which had
blanketed the city for days. Despite the sixty degree temperature,
the air held a winter crispness. Most of the people gathered at
Brown’s Chapel wore heavy overcoats and gloves. The nervous
conversations grew into an expectant murmur and then
applause as a young black man came into view. He walked
among the crowd, touched the extended hands, and moved to
the church steps to speak. He was their leader. Arguments
about whether or not to march ended. They would abide by his
decision. The deep, resonant voice of the Reverend Martin
Luther King, Jr., boomed out across the churchyard proclaiming, “I have no alternative but to lead a march from this spot
to carry our grievances to the seat of government. I have made
my choice. I have got to march.“ 1
Some of the people of Selma believed that if these civil rights
advocates marched “there would be many people dead by nightfall.” Tension permeated the city of 28,775, perched on a high
bluff on the north bank of the Alabama River. 2 Black citizens
of Dallas County had become adamant in their demand for
voting rights, economic opportunity, and integration. 3
The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee brought
the civil rights movement to Selma in the spring of 1963. In
N

*
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Mr. Wagy is a doctoral candidate in history at Florida State University,
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1. Selma Times-Journal, March 9, 1965; Charles E. Fager, Selma, 1965
(New York, 1974), 8, 103.
2. Fager, Selma, 102; New York Times, March 14, 1965.
3. W. C. Heinz and Bard Lindeman, “Great Day at Trickem Fork: The
Meaning of the Selma March,” Saturday Evening Post, May 22, 1965,
30-31, 89-95; Fager, Selma, 76, describes the poverty and segregation
which confronted most of Dallas County’s black citizens. Hosea Williams
v. George C. Wallace, 240 F. Sup. 104 (1965); New York Times, March
14, 1965; Fager, Selma, 8-9; Time, March 19, 1965, 23, discusses and
statistically analyzes the discrimination in voter registration.
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the next year and a half, the community experienced a series of
bitter demonstrations that saw hundreds jailed. In January 1965,
King added the strength of the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference to the Selma movement. 4 He anticipated that nonviolent demonstrations would elicit official repression, drawing
national attention to the suffrage issue. He stressed, “Just as
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was written in Birmingham, we
hope that the new federal voting legislation will be written here
in Selma.“ 5
Dallas County Sheriff James G. Clark served as the foil in
King’s design. Clark, at forty-three, was a tall, heavyset man with
his stomach sagging over his belt. He wore “a grey and brown
military-style uniform, complete with an officer’s billed hat
shiny with gold braid.” A billy club and battery-operated cattle
prod hung from his belt. He opposed any compromise on segregation. Backed by a volunteer posse, Clark insisted on a hard line
policy toward demonstrators. One observor noted, “When it came
to dealing with these ‘agitators,’ the sheriff seemed to go more
than a little crazy.“ 6
Alabama Governor George C. Wallace and Colonel Albert J.
Lingo, state director of public safety, cooperated with the local
authorities in suppressing demonstrations. Lingo, a former smalltown businessman and policeman, had been appointed by Wallace
in return for loyal political support. The reputation of Lingo’s
force for violence against blacks matched that of Clark’s posse.
As Lingo remarked, “We don’t believe in making arrests. It’s
better to break them up.“ 7
The conflict in Selma created an aura of hostility that spread
4. Robert M. Bleiweiss, ed., Marching to Freedom: The Life of Martin
Luther King, Jr. (New York, 1968), 124; Fager, Selma, 18-20.
5. Martin Luther King, “Behind the Selma March,” Saturday Review,
April 3, 1965, 16; New York Times, February 14, 1965, cited in Julia
Sullivan Chapman, “A Southern Moderate Advocates Compliance: A
Study of LeRoy Collins as Director of the Community Relations Service”
(M.A. thesis, University of South Florida, 1974), 48. For an analysis
of King’s strategy, see David J. Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin
Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (New Haven,
1978), 220-36.
6. Time, March 19, 1965, 23; Garrow, Protest at Selma, 227; Fager, Selma,
5, 18. The New York Times, March 9, 1965, noted that estimates of the
size of Clark’s posse ranged from 100 to 400.
7. Fager, Selma, 86-87, 47, 82; Montgomery Advertiser, March 14, 1965;
New York Times, March 9, 1965.
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across Alabama’s black belt. Violence followed. On February
17, a state trooper killed a black youth during a demonstration
in Marion, a Perry County community thirty miles northeast of
Selma. To protest the murder, civil rights leaders decided to
march fifty miles along U.S. Route 80 from Selma to the state
capitol in Montgomery. 8 On Sunday, March 7, 650 blacks set
out from Brown’s Chapel. Just across Edmund Pettus Bridge,
an impressive structure of concrete and steel girding the Alabama River, state troopers blocked the march. The troopers
attacked the blacks with clubs, tear gas, and smoke bombs. As
the terrified marchers scrambled back across the bridge, Clark’s
mounted posse joined the assault, wielding bullwhips, ropes, and
lengths of rubber tubing wrapped with barbed wire. Before the
bedlam ended seventeen blacks were hospitalized and sixtyseven others were treated for injuries. 9
The assault incensed the entire nation. King announced that
the march would be completed, and he called on sympathetic
clergymen to join him. The clergy’s response surprised even
King as over 400 priests, ministers, and rabbis pledged to meet
him in Selma on Tuesday, March 9. 10 Governor Wallace
recognized that violence harmed the segregationists’ cause, but
refused to sanction the Tuesday march. 11
Pressure mounted on President Lyndon B. Johnson to intervene in Alabama, and he decided to use the incident to fulfill a
campaign pledge for a law guaranteeing all Americans the
opportunity to vote. He realized the nation’s anger would likely
dissipate quickly; immediate action was essential. The Presi8. Montgomery Advertiser, March 14, 1965; Fager, Selma, 81.
9. Fager, Selma, 93-95; Montgomery Advertiser, March 8, 14, 1965; New
York Times, March 8, 9, 1965; Selma Times-Journal, March 8, 1965;
Tallahassee Democrat, March 14, 1965; Williams v. Wallace, 104-05;
Time, March 19, 1965, 27; Garrow, Protest at Selma, 73-77. The New
York Times, March 9, 1965, reported these casualty statistics. The Selma
Times-Journal, March 8, 1965, reported that eighteen of the fifty-six
treated were hospitalized, while the Montgomery Advertiser, March 8,
1965, reported that only thirty-five were treated.
10. Fager, Selma, 98; Garrow, Protest at Selma, 76, 78-82, 87-89; Montgomery
Advertiser, March 9, 1965; Bleiweiss, Marching to Freedom, 129. Rabbi
David Susskind, of St. Petersburg, Professors Keith Irwin and Kenneth
Keeton of Florida Presbyterian College, and the Reverend Alan
Carlsten, the college’s chaplain, all of whom were at Selma, discussed
their experiences in the St. Petersburg Times, March 10, 1965.
11. Bob Ingram, “Lingo Nearly Got Ax Over Selma Debacle,” Montgomery
Advertiser, March 14, 1965; New York Times, March 9, 1965.
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dent understood, as perhaps few Northerners in those emotional
days could have, that there existed in the South a large reservoir
of moderate opinion. He knew that many Southerners opposed
extra-legal or violent responses to the demands voiced by black
leaders and their followers. To retain the support of the
moderates, Johnson did not want to intrude without a request
from the state for assistance. The President was opposed to
making Wallace “a states’rights martyr.“ 12
Johnson tried to convince the Reverend Dr. King to postpone
Tuesday’s march in order to avoid a repeat of Sunday’s violence.
The President assured the black leader that if he delayed the
march, the administration’s voting rights bill would be completed by the weekend. Moreover, a federal judge issued an injunction barring the demonstration until hearings could be
held. 13 But the multitude gathered in Selma pressured King to
carry through. At four o’clock Tuesday morning he advised the
administration that he would defy the court and march. 14
Johnson’s plan to postpone the march appeared to have
failed. The almost certain violence would not only bring
criticism for not protecting the marchers but also would necessitate federal intervention which would undoubtedly undermine
the support of southern moderates for his voting rights bill. At
this crucial moment, the President turned to LeRoy Collins,
former governor of the state of Florida and now director of the
Community Relations Service. He asked Governor Collins to
go to Selma to try to head off the confrontation. 15
During the period that Collins had served as governor of
Florida, 1955 to 1961, the years of racial crisis, he had refused
to join the “massive resistance movement” which sought to
thwart implementation of court-ordered integration. Although
initially advocating legal opposition to the Brown decision,
Collins came to believe that Southerners had a moral obliga12. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency,
1963-1968 (New York, 1971), 162-63.
13. Miami Herald, March 10, 1965; David L. Lewis, King: A Critical
Biography (New York, 1970), 277; Williams v. Wallace, 102-03.
14. New York Times, March 10, 1965; Time, March 19, 1965, 25; Garrow,
Protest at Selma, 83-85; Andrew Kopkind, “Selma,” New Republic,
March 20, 1965, 7; Selma Times-Journal, March 9, 1965; Lewis, King,
277-78.
15. Interview with LeRoy Collins, Tallahassee, Florida, November 10,
1977.
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16

tion to change their racial customs. In a speech to the Southern
Governors’ Conference delivered during the 1957 Little Rock
integration crisis, Collins asserted, “[national sentiment] believes
that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are the
law of the land and insists that ours be a land of the law.“ 17
When the sit-in demonstrations in the spring of 1960 resulted in
violence in several Florida cities, Collins went on statewide
radio and television to call for peace. Denying blacks equal
rights, he argued, was un-Christian, undemocratic, and unrealistic. “We can never stop Americans from struggling to be
18
free,” he proclaimed. By the conclusion of his administration,
Collins’s racial views had advanced beyond those of a majority
of his constituents, but had gained for him national stature as a
leading southern moderate. 19
In 1961, Collins accepted the presidency of the National Association of Broadcasters, a private organization. He served a
stormy three-year term during which he questioned the broadcasters’ reliance on program ratings, the paucity of cultural
offerings, and then influence of cigarette advertising. 20 In 1964,
Johnson asked Collins to head the Community Relations Service,
the agency created by Congress in Title X of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to promote peaceful compliance with the law. Conservative Southerners insisted that the Community Relations
Service be established to help with education and understanding. 21 Johnson, first as Senate majority leader and then as Presi16.
17.
18.
19.

20.

21.

“Transcript of Statewide TV-Radio Talk to the People of Florida on
Race Relations, by Governor LeRoy Collins, March 20, 1960,” 5, box 24,
in the LeRoy Collins Papers, University of South Florida, Tampa.
“Remarks by Governor LeRoy Collins at Southern Governors’ Conference, Sea Island, Georgia, September 23, 1957,” 13, box 21, ibid.
“Talk on Race Relations,” 6, box 24, ibid.
During his second administration, Collins served as chairman of the
Southern Governors’ Conference, chairman of the National Governors’
Conference, and president ‘of the Council of State Governments. Collins’s
national recognition was culminated in his selection as permanent
chairman of the 1960 Democratic National Convention. See John L.
Perry, “Florida’s National Prestige,” in Florida Across the Threshold:
The Administration of Governor LeRoy Collins, January 4, 1955-January 3, 1961 ([Tallahassee?], [1960?]) , 391-96.
Barb Lustig, “He’s Tallahassee’s Own Statesman,” Tallahassee Democrat, September 10, 1967. For an analysis of Collins’s NAB presidency,
see Manny Lucoff, “LeRoy Collins and the NAB: Experiment in the
Public Interest” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1971).
Marquis Childs, “Peacemaker Stands in the Line of Fire,” Nashville
Tennessean, March 16, 1965.
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dent, had advocated a federal office to utilize moderate Southerners in conciliating racial conflicts in Dixie. 22 He took an active
role in the formation and staffing of the CRS. Congress placed
the agency under the Commerce Department since it dealt with
owners of such public accommodations facilities as motels,
restaurants, and theaters. Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges,
former governor of North Carolina and a close friend of Collins,
had recommended him as the ideal man to direct the CRS. 23
Collins represented the class of moderate Southerners on
whom Johnson based his strategy in the South. At the age of
fifty-six, he was tall and stately with white hair and deepening
lines in his face. He smiled easily and often and spoke with a
soft drawl characteristic of his native north Florida. Marquis
Childs, a nationally syndicated political columnist, felt that
Johnson could not have selected a better man. Childs wrote:
“[Collins] has a compassionate understanding of the problem
of integration as it affects both the South and the North and,
above all, the Negro. Slow spoken, almost courtly in manner,
he has the two qualities needed to stand resolute in the eye of
the storm-patience and an unshakeable calm.“ 24
Despite these qualifications, Collins hesitated to accept the
position. He had never been financially independent and the
National Association of Broadcasters’presidency paid three times
the amount provided for the CRS directorship. But his controversial stances at the NAB had led to criticism from conservative broadcasters. Although his position was secure, the
pressures of the office were extreme. Collins realized the CRS
post would be equally demanding, yet welcomed the opportunity
for change. Besides, he later remembered, “President Johnson
was the most persuasive man I’ve ever known.” Johnson told him,
“At this time, in the history of this country, this is the number
one job I’ve got to offer.” Collins understood the importance
of the office and wanted to serve the country in a time of crisis.
He also viewed a presidential request almost like a military
22. Annual Report of the Community Relations Service, Fiscal Year 1965
(Washington, 1966), 1.
23. Collins interview, November 10, 1977; John Herbers, The Lost Priority:
What Happened to the Civil Rights Movement in America? (New
York, 1970), 38.
24. Childs, “Peacemaker in the Line of Fire.”

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol57/iss4/3

6

Wagy: Governor Leroy Collins of Florida and the Selma Crisis of 1965
G OVERNOR L E R OY C OLLINS

409

command. Collins accepted the position, organized a staff, and
searched for solutions to the racial crisis through accommodation and conciliation. 25 The Selma confrontation constituted the
severest test for the strategy of the CRS. 26
Collins later reflected on the events of Tuesday, March 9,
1965, and concluded all he had done in his life seemed preparation for that day. 27 He flew to Craig Air Force Base near Selma
in one of the smaller, two engine jets made available for presidential use. He went immediately to the Federal Building in
downtown Selma where he conferred with John M. Doar,
assistant attorney general in charge of the Justice Department’s
Civil Rights Division. The court injunction prohibiting the
march placed Doar, as a representative of the Justice Department,
in a difficult position. He could not support any alternative to
obedience to the court. Collins, though, with a semi-independent status under the Commerce Department, could seek a compromise. The concept of a partial march developed from a discussion of the minimum demands of both sides. They sought a
strategy that would allow both the marchers and state officials
to claim victory. With the outline of a plan in mind, Collins
and Doar went to talk directly to Martin Luther King. 28
King was staying at the home of Dr. Sullivan Jackson, a
black dentist. When the federal officials arrived, they found
several black leaders in the living room where discussions had
been going on most of the night. King emerged from a bedroom
Collins interview, November 10, 1977. The Florida newspapers that
commented on the appointment concurred with the view of the editors
of the Miami Herald, July 4, 1964, who believed the nomination
“should reassure both friends and foes of the Civil Rights Act.” See the
Tampa Tribune, July 5, 1964; St. Petersburg Times, July 5, 1964;
Daytona Beach Morning Journal, July 9, 1964; and Miami News, July
9, 1964.
26. Miami Herald, March 11, 1965. Agency conciliators had been in Selma
since January 1965, seeking to open communications between the conflicting factions. CRS staffman Max Sechrest, a former South Carolina
newspaper publisher, had been intimately involved in the crisis and
worked closely with Collins in resolving the dispute. Collins interview,
November 10, 1977; Chapman, “Southern Moderate Advocates Compliance,” 49-51.
27. Robert H. Akerman, manuscript on the career of LeRoy Collins, 134,
cited in Chapman, “Southern Moderate Advocates. Compliance,” 49.
28. Chapman, “Southern Moderate Advocates Compliance,” 54; Childs,
“Peacemaker in the Line of Fire”; Collins interview, November, 1977;
New York Times, March 10, 1965.

25.
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still wearing his pajamas. 2 9 Collins and Doar pleaded with King
to abide by the court injunction, emphasizing the “explosive
situation” in Selma. The Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, a King
associate, argued that instead of asking blacks not to march,
Collins should urge the state troopers not to be brutal. Collins
sympathized but warned that a repeat of Sunday’s events would
be a tragedy for the entire nation. King insisted that his conscience required him to march. Moreover, he argued, many
people were so emotionally committed they would carry through
whether he led them or not. 30
Collins and Doar realized that further discussion of postponement of the march was useless. Doar withdrew from the
conversation since he could approve no action that contravened
the injunction. Collins, though, suggested a compromise. Would
King accept a symbolic victory? The demonstrators could walk
across Edmund Pettus Bridge, confront the troopers, hold a
prayer service, and then return to Selma. This stratagem would
allow blacks to express their indignation while avoiding direct
conflict with the troopers. King replied, “I cannot agree to do
anything because I don’t know what I can get my people to
do, but if you will get Sheriff Clark and Lingo to agree to
something like that, I will try.“ 31
Time was short. Collins set out to find Clark and Lingo. A
sense of foreboding blanketed the silent Selma streets as he
drove across town. Five hundred troopers, over two-thirds of
the state’s force, were in the city. As time for the march neared,
the troopers began to take positions in the center and at the
corners of each block. Across Edmund Pettus Bridge, whites
29. Miami Herald, March 10, 1965; Collins interview, November 10, 1977;
Fager, Selma, 102.
30. Tallahassee Democrat, March 11, 1965; King, “Behind the Selma March,”
57; Miami Herald, March 12, 1965; Chapman, “Southern Moderate
Advocates Compliance,” 55; Collins interview, November 10, 1977.
31. Collins interview, November 10, 1977; Tampa Tribune, March 11, 1965,
cited in Chapman, “Southern Moderate Advocates Compliance,” 54.
King in “Behind the Selma March,” 16, 57, wrote that charges he
had made a deal with the government “to throttle the indignation”
of the demonstrators were “a perversion of the facts.” King’s claim, in
part a response to criticism from militants of his role at Selma, might
have resulted from a question of semantics. What constituted a “deal?”
King certainly at no point guaranteed that he would turn the march
around. Collins, though, sought an agreement to try, and King did. For
a discussion of the conflicting interpretations of this meeting, see Lewis,
King, 278-79.
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congregated along Route 80 in anticipation of a repeat of Sunday’s spectacle. About 150 newsmen from around the world had
assembled to record the event. At the King’s Bend intersection,
the first stop light across the bridge, more than 100 troopers had
begun to form their barricade. 32
Collins found Clark and Lingo organizing their forces. Instead of his customary uniform, Clark wore a dark business
suit, a narrow striped tie, a black hat, and sunglasses. Lingo
was also attired in a business suit but incongruously wore a
white trooper’s helmet which was a bit oversized, resting just
above his eyes. They agreed to meet with Collins in a nearby
office at the rear of the Lehman Pontiac Company. 33
Clark and Lingo initially seemed antagonistic. Collins, however, urged them to accept his plan of a settlement which
would provide a facesaving victory for both sides. Edmund
Pettus Bridge had become a symbol for the civil rights advocates, he explained; blacks believed they had the right to cross
the bridge without being attacked on the other side. If Clark
and Lingo allowed the demonstrators to cross the bridge, confront the troopers, and have a twenty-minute prayer meeting,
they might then return to the church. But, for the plan to
succeed, the state forces would have to refrain from moving into
the marchers as they had on Sunday. His design would give
both sides a symbolic victory, Collins pointed out; since the
blacks would cross the bridge and the state officials would block
the march, which was their avowed purpose. 34
Clark and Lingo expressed an interest in the proposal, but
refused to make a commitment. Instead Lingo asked Collins to
step out into the hallway while he made a phone call. Collins
complied, assuming that Lingo was talking to Governor Wallace.
After a few minutes, Lingo summoned him back into the office,
and told him that they would try the arrangement. Clark drew a
map tracing a route from Brown’s Chapel which he adamantly insisted the marchers follow. Collins never understood the
sheriff’s concern with the map, but he had no time to press the
32. Selma Times-Journal, March 9, 10, 1965; Montgomery Advertiser, March
10, 1965; Time, March 19, 1965, 25; New York Times, March 10, 1965;
Birmingham News, March 10, 1965; Fager, Selma, 104.
33. Selma Times-Journal, March 10, 1965.
34. Collins interview, November 10, 1977.
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point. A man who witnessed the conference remembered,
“Colonel Lingo said the state did not want violence and there
would be none if the marchers turned back at the designated
point.“ 36 With this assurance, Collins rushed back across the
bridge to seek out King.
At about 2:15 p.m., while Collins was talking to Clark and
Lingo, King emotionally announced to the crowd of 2,500
gathered at Brown’s Chapel: “I have made my choice. I have
got to march.“ 37 Few carried supplies for a long march as they
moved out behind 450 clergymen. The demonstrators assumed
they were headed for a confrontation with the state forces, and
all remembered the bloody culmination of Sunday’s drama. “In
all frankness, we knew we would not get to Montgomery,” King
recalled. “We knew we would not get past the troopers.“ 38 At
an intersection near the church, some twenty hecklers hurled
jeers and curses at King, although most of the whites lining the
streets looked on silently. The protesters appeared grim but
resolute. Then, tentatively at first, but growing into a ringing
affirmation of faith, the marchers joined in the continuing
choruses of the movement’s familiar marching song, “Ain’t
Gonna Let Nobody Turn Me Around.“ 39
Fired by his hope that he held the key to the crisis, Governor
Collins fell in beside Martin Luther King as the front ranks
moved through Selma. He showed the civil rights leader Clark’s
rough sketch and explained the agreement. King restated his
concern that he could not stop the marchers, but accepted the
plan, providing the troopers gave them time for prayer and did
not attempt to push them back. Despite grave doubts, King concluded, “I’ll do my best.” Collins promised to stand in the line
with the troopers and try to see that all kept their word. 40
35. Ibid.
36. An unidentified informant, New York Times, March 10, 1965.
37. Fager, Selma, 103. Estimates on the number of marchers varied. The
New York Times, March 10, 1965, reported 1,500; Garrow, Protest at
Selma, 86, stated 2,000; Fager, Selma, 103, claimed 3,000; while both the
Selma Times-Journal, March 10, 1965, and Tallahassee Democrat,
March 10, 1965, reported 2,500.
38. New York Times, March 10, 1965.
39. Selma Times-Journal, March 9, 10, 1965; Lewis, King, 279; Montgomery
Advertiser, March 10, 1965; Fager, Selma, 103.
40. Collins interview, November 10, 1977; King’s account in “Behind the
Selma March,” differed only slightly, but did contend that no deal
was made.
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“We’ll all do the best we can,” Collins added. “I think everything will be all right.“ 41
Collins again scurried across Edmund Pettus Bridge. A double
line of troopers now crossed Route 80 and whites filled the parking lots alongside the road. Collins informed Clark and Lingo
that King had accepted the proposal. He assured them the plan
would work, although they remained skeptical. Collins insisted on standing with the front rank of troopers in order to be
near the confrontation. 42 One newspaperman observing the
scene reported, “Collins was with state and county forces at the
head of the column of whites and had there been the kind of
difficulty which occurred Sunday he would have been in the
middle of it.“ 43 Collins and the others gathered on Route 80
waited nervously for the marchers to appear.
A palpable tension gripped Selma, Washington, and, indeed,
the nation as King led the ecumenical and interracial march
toward Edmund Pettus Bridge. The line, stretching back nearly
a mile, walked up Sylvan Street to Water Avenue, and then
along the Alabama River to Broad Street. At the foot of the
bridge, Chief Deputy United States Marshal H. Stanley Fountain
read the court order banning the demonstration. King stated
his determination to continue, and the marshal stepped aside.
The front ranks turned sharply left and began to cross the
elevated bridge. The singing ceased as the marchers reached
the crest and saw the “human wall” which blocked their path.
King led the silent line down Route 80 toward Montgomery.
For those standing at the King’s Bend intersection, the tightly
bunched procession appeared to be pouring across the bridge in
a tidal wave. Collins would always remember the sight of the
black and white mass that filled the highway and edged closer
to him and the troopers. 44
“What happened next was a little play that Collins worked
45
out on the spot,” one observer commented. Major John Cloud
41. Montgomery Advertiser, March 12, 1965; New York Times, March 12,
1965.
42. Collins interview, November 10, 1977.
43. St. Petersburg Times, March 10, 1965.
44. Selma Times-Journal, March 10, 1965; Montgomery Advertiser, March
10, 1965; Fager, Selma, 103; Collins interview, November 10, 1977. The
phrase, “human wall,” is from King, “Behind the Selma March,” 57.
45. Credited to an “informed government source” in the Miami Herald,
March 11, 1965.
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stood in front of the troopers. He waited until the marchers
were within fifty feet and then through a bullhorn yelled: “You
are ordered to stop and stand where you are. This march will
not continue.” King replied, “We have a right to march. There
is also a right to march to Montgomery.” Cloud repeated the
order. Doar, observing the proceedings from an upper story
window of the Federal Building, gave a moment by moment
telephone account to Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach in
Washington. As King and Cloud talked, Doar reported, “They’re
up to the barricade.” At 2:56 p.m., Katzenbach informed presidential aide Bill Moyers at the White House, “We’re right at
the critical moment. I’ll keep you posted.“ 46 On Route 80, the
confrontation had reached an impasse. At least one person,
though, sensed the restrained rhetoric in the encounter. He
wrote, “Like characters in a play, King and Cloud spoke their
lines and went through their motions. If it was not rehearsed, it
could have been. Passion fled the scene; they were all mechanical men filling their inevitable roles.“ 47 Collins, the author
of the scene, looked on anxiously to be certain they followed the
script.
Testing Collins’s plan, King asked if they could pray. “You
can have your prayer, and then you must return to your church,”
Cloud insisted. King asked the Reverend Ralph Abernathy to
lead the devotions, and the line stretching back to the crest of
the bridge knelt down. Abernathy prayed: “We come to present
our bodies as a living sacrifice. We don’t have much to offer
but we do have our bodies, and we lay them on the altar
today.” Other national religious figures also offered prayers.
When the marchers rose from their knees, they joined in singing
the anthem of the civil rights movement, “We Shall Overcome.”
The service had lasted for fifteen minutes. 48
Cloud then made a surprising move. He shouted, “Troopers,
withdraw!” The men stepped aside. Later, commentators would
contend that Wallace had ordered the maneuver to expose
46. Fager, Selma, 103-05; New York Times, March 10, 1965; Chapman,
“Southern Moderate Advocates Compliance,” 56; Selma Times-Journal,
March 10, 1965; Time, March 19, 1965. 26.
47. Kopkind, “Selma,” 26.
48. Chapman, “Southern Moderate Advocates Compliance,” 56; Fager,
Selma, 104; New York Times, March 10, 1965; Time, March 19, 1965,
26; Kopkind, “Selma,” 8; Birmingham News, March 10, 1965.
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King’s lack of militancy to black radicals. A state official at the
scene told a federal officer standing nearby that the order came
directly from Wallace’s office where the governor was directing
the events by telephone. 49 Whatever the purpose of the action,
it threatened Collins’s plan. Route 80 to Montgomery now lay
open before the marchers. Doar reported the startling development to Katzenbach. All awaited King’s decision. Then
Doar exclaimed, “King is walking back this way. He’s asking
the marchers to turn back.” Katzenbach quickly informed the
White House, “King has turned around.“ 50 The demonstrators
followed him. Collins had succeeded. As he later remarked,
“Tears were left there on Pettus Bridge that day, but no blood.“ 51
As Martin Luther King led the front ranks back across the
bridge, those behind walked to the point where the leaders
had been and then turned around. Most were satisfied. After
preparing themselves to face death, they had confronted the
troopers and returned unharmed. They had demonstrated their
determination to protest repression. Moreover, King pledged
to complete the march to Montgomery, even if troopers or legal
obstacles delayed their plans. 52
After the demonstrators turned back, Collins talked with
Katzenbach to explain the particulars of the feat. When reporters questioned Collins, he refused to reply in detail, citing
the statute requiring the agency’s activities to be confidential.
Also, President Johnson wanted the federal role deemphasized. 53
Collins accentuated the contributions of local officials in avoiding the conflict. He told newsmen, “I think good people on both
sides were anxious to avoid violence.“ 54 He concluded, “I am
delighted that all the people involved today used good judgment and good sense.“ 55
The President privately congratulated Collins, saying that
49. Fager, Selma, 104-05. Time, March 19, 1965, 26; and Lewis, King,
280, also stated that Wallace acted to discredit King.
50. Selma Times-Journal, March 10, 1965; Time, March 19, 1965, 56; Chapman, “Southern Moderate Advocates Compliance,” 56.
51. Akerman, manuscript on the career of LeRoy Collins, 149-50, cited in
Chapman, “Southern Moderate Advocates Compliance,” 56.
52. Fager, Selma, 105; New York Times, March 10, 1965.
53. Selma Times-Journal, March 10, 1965; Miami Herald, March 11, 1965;
Tallahassee Democrat, March 10, 1965.
54. New York Times, March 10, 1965.
55. St. Petersburg Times, March 10, 1965.
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had he not defused the Selma crisis “the ditches would have been
knee-deep in blood.“ 56 To underscore his contribution, Collins
and his wife were invited to share the presidential box with the
first family as Johnson called on Congress to pass a voting rights
bill. When the act was passed in the summer of 1965 (with the
support of thirty-seven Southerners in the House of Representatives), the President presented Collins with one of the pens
used to sign the measure into law. 57
On Wednesday, March 17, the federal court ruled that King
could carry through with the march to Montgomery and directed the state to provide protection. 58 When Wallace informed Johnson that his state could not afford to escort the
demonstrators, the President federalized the Alabama National
Guard to do the job. Thus, the President’s plan to avoid intrusion, unless requested by the state, had succeeded. That
Alabamians themselves served in the force protecting the march,
59
Johnson argued, “made all the difference in the world.“
Collins’s achievement in heading off violence in Selma had
helped make possible the success of the strategy.
Collins also played a role in the march to Montgomery
that began on March 21, two weeks after the bloody attack at
Edmund Pettus Bridge. Officials feared the demonstrators would
be met with violence when they entered the capital city. Collins
went to Montgomery where he worked out plans with local
leaders to avoid conflict. He then conferred with King while
walking along the march route and gained his cooperation.
Newsmen photographed the scene which appeared in papers
around the country and throughout the world. 60
The national attention given Collins’s effort in Selma evoked
pride from many in his home state. The Miami Herald exalted
56. Collins interview, November 10, 1977.
57. Ibid. Garrow in Protest at Selma, 135-60, analyzed the impact of the
events in Selma on the passage of the voting rights bill. A majority
of Florida’s congressmen supported the measure, including Charles
E. Bennett, William C. Cramer, Dante B. Fascell, Sam M. Gibbons, A.
Sydney Herlong, Jr., Claude Pepper, and Paul G. Rogers. Senator
George A. Smathers also voted for the bill. Congressional Quarterly
Almanac, 89th Cong., 1st Session (Washington, 1965), XXI, 563, 984,
1063.
58. Williams v. Wallace, 110-11.
59. Johnson, Vantage Point, 163.
60. Chapman, “Southern Moderate Advocates Compliance,” 60.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol57/iss4/3

14

Wagy: Governor Leroy Collins of Florida and the Selma Crisis of 1965
G OVERNOR L E R OY C OLLINS

417

Florida’s “man of moderation.” “There was plenty of face that
needed saving on the streets of Selma,” the editors felt, “but it
was managed.” The Tallahassee Democrat, Collins’s hometown newspaper, reported that he was being pushed for a
cabinet post. But it quoted “one friend“ of Collins who perceived the mixed feelings of many. “There wasn’t another
southerner who could do what Roy’s doing for the President,”
he observed. “Yet he may have hurt his political career in
Florida-for the time being anyway.“ 61
Collins’s role in Selma confused many of his former constituents. The photograph of Collins talking to King contributed to the misunderstanding. The Pensacola Journal, for
example, captioned the picture, “Collins Marches With King.“ 62
Some Floridians believed Collins had worked with King to
organize and carry out the march to Montgomery. A former
supporter from Gainesville wrote, “I wish you disassociate [sic]
yourself from King.“ 63 A Tampa woman emphasized “the dirt,
filth, and immorality that have been connected with the demonstrations and march from Selma to Montgomery.” She thought,
“It is hard to picture anyone as fastidious as our former
Goevenor [sic] of Florida allowing himself to become associated
with a group of hoodlums.“ 64 The restrictions against the
Community Relations Service publicizing its actions kept Collins
from clearly explaining the events in Selma to Floridians. 65
In June 1965, Collins resigned his position with the CRS
to become Undersecretary of Commerce. The next year he left
Washington to join a Tampa law firm. In 1968, he campaigned
for the United States Senate. His role in Selma became a major
issue in both the Democratic primary and the general election.
Collins’s opponents accused him of actively participating in the
61. Miami Herald, March 11, 1965; Tallahassee Democrat, March 21, 1965.
62. Pensacola Journal, March 26, 1965. The Miami Herald, March 23, 1965,
captioned the photograph, “Former Florida Governor LeRoy Collins
Joins Marchers,” while the Orlando Sentinel, March 23, 1965, stated,
“LeRoy Collins . . . Joins Civil Rights Marchers.” The Tallahassee
Democrat, March 23, 1965, noted that Collins walked only about a
mile. None pointed out that Collins was engaged in official government business.
63. John W. Hastings to LeRoy Collins, March 23, 1965, box 309, Collins
Papers.
64. Katherine A. Cunningham to LeRoy Collins, March 25, 1965, box 308,
ibid.
65. Collins interview, November 10, 1977.
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Selma to Montgomery march. They presented the newspaper
photographs of him and King discussing the plans for entering
Montgomery as evidence that Collins helped lead the march. 66
An editorial in the Mayo Free Press illustrated the use of the
Selma issue. Under the photograph with arrows pointing to
Collins and King, the article quoted from a purported contemporary newspaper account of the incident: “Former Governor, LeRoy Collins, acted as President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
personal representative during the invasion of Alabama. . . .
According to Sheriff James G. Clark, of Selma, Collins made
the arrangements for the infamous Selma to Montgomery March,
and participated in it along with numerous reds, pinks, and degenerates. The Selma to Montgomery March has been called
one of the ‘filthiest, most disgraceful events ever to occur in a
civilized society.’” The newspaper commented, “Note this
picture carefully. Then make up you [sic] mind if you want to
vote for Collins next Tuesday.“ 67
Collins narrowly won the primary, but the Selma issue had
been fixed in the minds of many voters. 68 “It was said in the
campaign that I was at Selma. The people assumed from this
simple statement that I was leading the march. . . . This was
proof positive that I was an evil ‘liberal,’” Collins explained. 69
While benefitting from the acrimony created within the Democratic party, Edward J. Gurney of Winter Park, the Republican
candidate, did not emphasize Selma in his campaign. Instead,
he stressed his support for “law and order” and characterized
Collins as “liberal LeRoy.“ 70 Gurney won the election. 71
66. Lustig, “He’s Tallahassee’s Own Statesman;” Martin Dyckman, “LeRoy
Collins-Back Home With Dignity,” St. Petersburg Times, March 15,
1970. For an analysis of the role of the Selma issue in the election of
1968, see Ruth F. Espey, “The Anatomy of Defeat: The 1968 United
States Senatorial Campaign of LeRoy Collins” (M.A. thesis, University
of South Florida, 1974), 54-55, 61, 85-86, 92, 103-04, 131-33, 145-46.
67. Mayo Free Press, May 23, 1968.
68. Collins interview, November 10, 1977. The results in the runoff election were 410,689 votes for Collins and 407,696 votes for Florida Attorney
General Earl Faircloth. Tom Adams, Secretary of State, comp., Tabulation of Official Vote, Florida Primary Elections, Democratic and Republican, May 7, 1968 and May 28, 1968 ([n.p.], [n.d.]), 23.
69. Dyckman, “LeRoy Collins.”
70. Espey, “Anatomy of Defeat,” 114, 145.
71. Gurney received 1,131,499 votes, while Collins garnered 892,637 votes.
Tom Adams, Secretary of State, comp., Tabulation of Official Votes
Cast in the General Election, November 5, 1968 ([n.p.], [n.d.]), [iii].
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Selma’s influence transcended its impact on Collins. The
Voting Rights Act of 1965 wrought a revolution in southern
politics. By November 1966, one-half million new black voters
had registered in the South. The bill to which Clark and Lingo
had inadvertently contributed ended their careers. In 1966, blacks
helped to defeat Lingo’s campaign for Jefferson County sheriff,
while over 8,500 new black registrants in Dallas County were
decisive in denying Clark’s bid for reelection. By 1973, five blacks
were serving on Selma’s ten-member city council. 72
The conflict in Selma also affected the civil rights movement,
widening the gulf between King’s nonviolent ideology and those
demanding more radical tactics. Militants charged that King
had betrayed the marchers in Selma by making a deal with
Collins. 73 Eldridge Cleaver, an emerging radical leader, maintained that King “denied history a great moment, never to be
recaptured.“ 74 In the summer of 1965, riots in Watts, a black
residential section of Los Angeles, suggested that many had lost
faith in the efficacy of the interracial, nonviolent civil rights
movement. 75
As CRS director, Collins warned northern urban leaders of
the explosive situation in the black slums. He began shifting
the agency’s emphasis to the cities and opened communications
with militant leaders. He did not consider racism an exclusively
southern phenomenon. “The struggle now belongs to the whole
nation, which should rally to its support and commit itself to
achieving civil rights goals quickly and completely,” he charged.
To facilitate communication, Governor Collins recruited people
with varied backgrdunds and ideas. “We have a man for every
occasion,” a staff member noted. “We have an Uncle Tom, a
black nationalist, a Mister Charlie, and a fuzzy white liberal.“ 76
72. Garrow, Protest at Selma, 187-88, 199, 205; Fager, Selma, 209; Dorothy
Sterling, Tear Down the Walls! (Garden City, New York, 1968), 195.
Despite advances, Garrow in Protest at Selma, 211, pointed out, blacks
had not gained “proportional political representation and proportional political power.”
73. New York Times, March 12, 1965; Childs, “Peacemaker Stands in
the Line of Fire”; Chapman, “Southern Moderate Advocates Compliance,” 57.
74. Lewis, King, 282.
75. Ibid., 281; Herbers, Lost Priority, 86: William E. Leuchtenburg, A
Troubled Feast: American Society Since 1945 (Boston, 1973), 153-54.
76. Herbers, Lost Priority, 39, 155-56.
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But in the divisive years that followed, the CRS did not
play an influential role. Collins believed the CRS’s achievement
at Selma marked a turning point for the agency. 77 Previously,
the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department led the
federal effort against racial discrimination. 78 Selma demonstrated
the limits of legalisms. Pragmatism succeeded. Collins felt the
attention concentrated on the CRS created personal jealousies
and a demand for greater bureaucratic control over the agency. 79
In September 1965, an executive order reorganized the federal
civil rights offices, transferring the CRS to the Justice Department. A new dimension in governmental action was lost. 80
Following his unsuccessful Senate bid, Collins retired from
government service and joined a Tallahassee law firm. He professed no regrets. “My job was to help get adjustments made by
conference and mutual good will,” he reflected, “and not through
violence and street confrontation. I think I did it well, and if I
had to do it over again, I would do the same thing and hope
we could do as well. And I would do this even if I knew it would
materially influence my defeat for the United States Senate.“ 81
Governor Collins had performed a remarkable service by averting
bloodshed in Selma. Yet his accomplishment proved to be a
costly triumph for the course of moderation and conciliation
which he championed.
77. Collins interview, November 10, 1977.
78. Herbers, Lost Priority, 154.
79. Collins interview, November 10, 1977.
80. Herbers, Lost Priority, 162; Chapman, “Southern Moderate Advocates
Compliance,” 84.
81. Dyckman, “LeRoy Collins.”

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol57/iss4/3

18

